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Abstract
Modeling the purposeful behavior of imper-
fect agents from a small number of obser-
vations is a challenging task. When re-
stricted to the single-agent decision-theoretic
setting, inverse optimal control techniques
assume that observed behavior is an approxi-
mately optimal solution to an unknown deci-
sion problem. These techniques learn a util-
ity function that explains the example behav-
ior and can then be used to accurately predict
or imitate future behavior in similar observed
or unobserved situations.
In this work, we consider similar tasks in
competitive and cooperative multi-agent do-
mains. Here, unlike single-agent settings, a
player cannot myopically maximize its re-
ward — it must speculate on how the other
agents may act to influence the game’s out-
come. Employing the game-theoretic notion
of regret and the principle of maximum en-
tropy, we introduce a technique for predicting
and generalizing behavior, as well as recover-
ing a reward function in these domains.
1. Introduction
Predicting the actions of others in complex and strate-
gic settings is an important facet of intelligence that
guides our interactions—from walking in crowds to ne-
gotiating multi-party deals. Recovering such behavior
from merely a few observations is an important and
challenging machine learning task.
While mature computational frameworks for decision-
making have been developed to prescribe the behav-
ior that an agent should perform, such frameworks are
This is a preliminary draft. Copyright 2011 by the au-
thor(s)/owner(s).
often ill-suited for predicting the behavior that an
agent will perform. Foremost, the standard assump-
tion of decision-making frameworks that a criteria for
preferring actions (e.g., costs, motivations and goals)
is known a priori often does not hold. Moreover, real
behavior is typically not consistently optimal or com-
pletely rational; it may be influenced by factors that
are difficult to model or subject to various types of er-
ror when executed. Meanwhile, the standard tools of
statistical machine learning (e.g., classification and re-
gression) may be equally poorly matched to modeling
purposeful behavior; an agent’s goals often succinctly,
but implicitly, encode a strategy that would require
tremendous amounts of data to learn.
A natural approach to mitigate the complexity of re-
covering a full strategy for an agent is to consider iden-
tifying a compactly expressed utility function that ra-
tionalizes observed behavior: that is, identify rewards
for which the demonstrated behavior is optimal and
then leverage these rewards for future prediction. Un-
fortunately, the problem is fundamentally ill-posed:
in general, many reward functions can make behavior
seem rational, and in fact, the trivial, everywhere 0 re-
ward function makes all behavior appear rational (Ng
& Russell, 2000). Further, after removing such trivial
reward functions, there may be no reward function for
which the demonstrated behavior is optimal as agents
may be imperfect and the real world they operate in
may be only approximately represented.
In the single-agent decision-theoretic setting, inverse
optimal control methods have been used to bridge
this gap between the prescriptive frameworks and
predictive applications (Abbeel & Ng, 2004; Ratliff
et al., 2006; Ziebart et al., 2008a; 2010). Success-
ful applications include learning and prediction tasks
in personalized vehicle route planning (Ziebart et al.,
2008a), robotic crowd navigation (Henry et al., 2010),
quadruped foot placement and grasp selection (Ratliff
et al., 2009). A reward function is learned by these
techniques that both explains demonstrated behavior
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and approximates the optimality criteria of prescrip-
tive decision-theoretic frameworks.
As these methods only capture a single reward func-
tion and do not reason about competitive or cooper-
ative motives, inverse optimal control proves inade-
quate for modeling the strategic interactions of mul-
tiple agents. In this paper, we consider the game-
theoretic concept of regret as a necessary stand-in for
the optimality criteria of the single-agent work. As
with the inverse optimal control problem, the result is
fundamentally ill-posed. We address this by requiring
that for any utility function linear in known features,
our learned model must have no more regret than that
of the observed behavior. We demonstrate that this
requirement can be re-cast as a set of equivalent con-
vex constraints that we denote the inverse correlated
equilibrium (ICE) polytope.
As we are interested in the effective prediction of be-
havior, we will use a maximum entropy criteria to
select behavior from this polytope. We demonstrate
that optimizing this criteria leads to mini-max opti-
mal prediction of behavior subject to approximate ra-
tionality. We consider the dual of this problem and
note that it generalizes the traditional log-linear max-
imum entropy family of problems (Della Pietra et al.,
2002). We provide a simple and computationally ef-
ficient gradient-based optimization strategy for this
family and show that only a small number of obser-
vations are required for accurate prediction and trans-
fer of behavior. We conclude by considering a matrix
routing game and compare the ICE approach to a va-
riety of natural alternatives.
Before we formalize imitation learning in matrix
games, motivate our assumptions and describe and an-
alyze our approach, we will review the game-theoretic
notions of regret and the correlated equilibrium.
2. Game Theory Background
Matrix games are the canonical tool of game the-
orists for representing strategic interactions ranging
from illustrative toy problems, such as the “Prisoner’s
Dilemma” and the “Battle of the Sexes” games, to im-
portant negotiations, collaborations, and auctions. In
this work, we employ a class of games with payoffs or
utilities that are linear functions of features defined
over the outcome space.
Definition 1. A linearly parameterized normal-
form game, or matrix game, Γ = (N,A, F ), is
composed of: a finite set of players, N ; a set of
joint-actions or outcomes, A = ×i∈NAi, consist-
ing of a finite set of actions for each player, Ai; a set
of outcome features, F = {θia ∈ RK} for each out-
come that induce a parameterized utility function,
ui(a|w) = θiaTw – the reward for player i achieving
outcome a w.r.t. utility weights w.
For notational convenience, we let a−i denote the vec-
tor a excluding component i and letA−i = ×j 6=i,j∈NAi
be the set of such vectors.
In contrast to standard normal-form games where the
utility functions for game outcomes are known, in this
work we assume that “true” utility weights, w∗, which
govern observed behavior, are unknown. This allows
us to model real-world scenarios where a cardinal util-
ity is not available or is subject to personal taste.
We model the players with a distribution σ ∈ ∆A
over the game’s joint-actions. Coordination between
players can exist, thus, this distribution need not fac-
tor into independent strategies for each player. Con-
ceptually, a signaling mechanism, such as a traffic
light, can be thought to sample a joint-action from
σ and communicate to each player ai, its portion
of the joint-action. Each player can then consider
deviating from ai using a modification function,
fi : Ai 7→ Ai (Blum & Mansour, 2007).
The switch modification function, for instance,
switchx→yi (ai) =
{
y if ai = x
ai otherwise
(1)
substitutes action y for recommendation x.
Instantaneous regret measures how much a player
would benefit from a particular modification function
when the coordination device draws joint-action a,
regreti(a|fi, w) = ui(fi(ai), a−i|w)− ui(a|w) (2)
=
[
θifi(ai),a−i − θiai,a−i
]T
w (3)
= rfiTi,a w. (4)
Players do not have knowledge of the complete joint-
action; thus, each must reason about the expected
regret with respect to a modification function,
σTRfii w = Ea∼σ [regreti(a|fi, w)] (5)
=
∑
a∈A
σar
fiT
i,a w. (6)
It is helpful to consider regret with respect to a class
of modification functions. Two classes are particularly
important for our discussion. First, internal regret
corresponds to the set of modification functions where
a single action is replaced by a new action, Φinti =
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{switchx→yi (·) : ∀x, y ∈ Ai}. Second, swap regret
corresponds to the set of all modification functions,
Φswapi = {fi}. We denote Φ = ∪i∈N Φi.
The expected regret with respect to Φ and out-
come distribution σ,
RΦ(σ,w) = max
fi∈Φ
Ea∼σ [regreti(a|fi, w)] , (7)
is important for understanding the incentive to deviate
from, and hence the stability of, the specified behavior.
The most general modification class, Φswap, leads to
the notion of ε-correlated equilibrium (Osborne &
Rubinstein, 1994), in which σ satisfies RΦ
swap
(σ,w∗) ≤
ε. Thus, regret can be thought of as a substitute for
utility when assessing the optimality of behavior in
multi-agent settings.
3. Imitation Learning in Matrix Games
We are now equipped with the tools necessary to in-
troduce our approach for imitation learning in multi-
agent settings. As input, we observe a sequence of
outcomes, {am}Mm=1, sampled from σ, the true be-
havior. We denote the empirical distribution of this
sequence, σ˜, the demonstrated behavior. We aim
to learn a predictive behavior distribution, σˆ from
these demonstrations. Moreover, we would like our
learning procedure to extract the motives and intent
for the behavior so that we may imitate the players in
similarly structured, but unobserved games.
Imitation appears hard barring further assumptions.
In particular, if the agents are unmotivated or their
intentions are not coerced by the observed game, there
is little hope of recovering principled behavior in a new
game. Thus, we require some form of rationality.
3.1. Rationality Assumptions
We say that agents are rational under their true pref-
erences when they are indifferent between σˆ and their
true behavior if and only if RΦ(σˆ, w∗) ≤ RΦ(σ,w∗).
As agents’ true preferences w∗ are unknown to the ob-
server, we must consider an encompassing assumption
that requires any behavior that we estimate to satisfy
this property for all possible utility weights, or
∀w ∈ RK , RΦ(σˆ, w) ≤ RΦ(σ,w). (8)
Any behavior achieving this restriction, strong ratio-
nality, is also rational, and, by virtue of the contraposi-
tive, we see that unless we have additional information
regarding the agents’ true preferences, we must assume
this strong assumption or we risk violating rationality.
Lemma 1. If strong rationality does not hold for alter-
native behavior σˆ then there exist agent utilities such
that they would prefer σ to σˆ.
By restricting our attention to behavior that satisfies
strong rationality, at worst, agents acting according to
unknown true preference w∗ will be indifferent between
our predictive distribution and their true behavior.
3.2. Inverse Correlated Equilibria
Unfortunately, a direct translation of the strong ra-
tionality requirement into constraints on the distribu-
tion σˆ leads to a non-convex optimization problem as
it involves products of varying utility vectors and the
behavior to be estimated. Fortunately, however, we
can provide an equivalent concise convex description
of the constraints on σˆ that ensures any feasible dis-
tribution satisfies strong rationality. We denote this
set of equivalent constraints as the Inverse Correlated
Equilibria (ICE) polytope:
Definition 2 (ICE Polytope).
σˆTRfii =
∑
fj∈Φ
ηfifj σ˜
TR
fj
j ,∀fi ∈ Φ (9)
ηfi ∈ ∆Φ,∀fi ∈ Φ; σˆ ∈ ∆A.
Theorem 1. A distribution, σˆ, satisfies the con-
straints above for some η if and only if it satisfies
strong rationality. That is, ∀w ∈ RK , RΦ(σˆ, w) ≤
RΦ(σ˜, w) if and only if ∀fi ∈ Φ,∃ηfi ∈ ∆Φ such that
σˆTRfii =
∑
fj∈Φ η
fi
fj
σ˜TR
fj
j .
The proof of Theorem 1 is provided in the Ap-
pendix (Waugh et al., 2011).
We note that this polytope, perhaps unsurprisingly, is
similar to the polytope of correlated equilibrium itself,
but here is defined in terms of the behavior we observe
instead of the (unknown) reward function. Given any
observed behavior σ, the constraints are feasible as
the demonstrated behavior satisfies them; our goal is
to choose from these behaviors without estimating a
full joint-action distribution. While the ICE polytope
establishes a basic requirement for estimating rational
behavior, there are generally infinitely many distribu-
tions consistent with its constraints.
3.3. Principle of Maximum Entropy
As we are interested in the problem of statistical pre-
diction of strategic behavior, we must find a mecha-
nism to resolve the ambiguity remaining after account-
ing for the rationality constraints. The principle of
maximum entropy provides a principled method for
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choosing such a distribution. This choice leads to not
only statistical guarantees on the resulting predictions,
but to efficient optimization.
The Shannon entropy of a distribution σˆ is defined as
H(σˆ) = −∑x∈X σˆx log σˆx. The principle of max-
imum entropy advocates choosing the distribution
with maximum entropy subject to known (linear) con-
straints (Jaynes, 1957):
σMaxEnt = argmax
σˆ∈∆X
H(σˆ), subject to: (10)
g(σˆ) = 0 and h(σˆ) ≤ 0.
The resulting log-linear family of distributions (e.g.,
logistic regression, Markov random fields, conditional
random fields) are widely used within statistical ma-
chine learning. For our problem, the constraints are
precisely that the distribution is in the ICE polytope,
ensuring that whatever distribution is learned has no
more regret than the demonstrated behavior.
Importantly, the maximum entropy distribution sub-
ject to our constraints enjoys the following guarantee:
Lemma 2. The maximum entropy ICE distribution
minimizes over all strongly rational distributions the
worst-case log-loss , −∑a∈A σa log σˆa, when σ is cho-
sen adversarially and subject to strong rationality.
The proof of Lemma 2 follows immediately from the
result of Gru¨nwald and Dawid (2003).
In the context of multi-agent behavior, the principle of
maximum entropy has been employed to obtain corre-
lated equilibria with predictive guarantees in normal-
form games when the utilities are known a priori (Or-
tiz et al., 2007). We will now leverage its power with
our rationality assumption to select predictive distri-
butions in games where the utilities are unknown.
3.4. Prediction of Behavior
Let us first consider prediction of the demonstrated
behavior using the principle of maximum entropy and
our strong rationality condition. After, we will extend
to behavior transfer and analyze the error introduced
as a by-product of sampling σ˜ from σ.
The mathematical program that maximizes the en-
tropy of σˆ under strong rationality with respect to σ˜,
argmax
σˆ,η
H(σˆ), subject to: (11)
σˆTRfii =
∑
fj∈Φ
ηfifj σ˜
TR
fj
j ,∀fi ∈ Φ
ηfi ∈ ∆Φ,∀fi ∈ Φ; σˆ ∈ ∆A,
is convex with linear constraints, feasible, and
bounded. That is, it is simple and can be efficient
solved in this form. Before presenting our preferred
dual optimization procedure, however, let us describe
an approach for behavior transfer that further illus-
trates the advantages of this approach over directly
estimating σ.
3.5. Transfer of Behavior
A principal justification of inverse optimal control
techniques that attempt to identify behavior in terms
of utility functions is the ability to consider what be-
havior might result if the underlying decision problem
were changed while the interpretation of features into
utilities remain the same (Ng & Russell, 2000; Ratliff
et al., 2006). This enables prediction of agent behavior
in a no-regret or agnostic sense in problems such as a
robot encountering novel terrain (Silver et al., 2010)
as well as route recommendation for drivers traveling
to unseen destinations (Ziebart et al., 2008b).
Econometricians are interested in similar situations,
but for much different reasons. Typically, they aim
to validate a model of market behavior from observa-
tions of product sales. In these models, the firms as-
sume a fixed pricing policy given known demand. The
econometrician uses this fixed policy along with prod-
uct features and sales data to estimate or bound both
the consumers’ utility functions as well as unknown
production parameters, like markup and production
cost (Berry et al., 1995; Nevo, 2001; Yang, 2009). In
this line of work, the observed behavior is considered
accurate to start with; it is not suitable for settings
with limited observations.
Until now, we have considered the problem of identi-
fying behavior in a single game. We note, however,
that our approach enables behavior transfer to games
equipped with the same features. We denote this un-
observed game as Γ¯. As with prediction, to develop
a technique for behavior transfer we assume a link
between regret and the agents’ preferences across the
known space of possible preferences. Furthermore, we
assume a relation between the regrets in both games.
Property 1 (Transfer Rationality). For some con-
stant κ > 0,
∀w, R¯Φ¯(σ¯, w) ≤ κRΦ(σ,w). (12)
Roughly, we assume that under preferences with low
regret in the original game, the behavior in the unob-
served game should also have low regret. By enforcing
this property, if the agents are performing well with
respect to their true preferences, then the transferred
behavior will also be of high quality.
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As we are not privileged to know κ and this prop-
erty is not guaranteed to hold, we introduce a slack
variable to allow for violations of the strong rational-
ity constraints to guaranteeing feasibility. Intuitively,
the transfer-ICE polytope we now optimize over re-
quires that for any linear reward function and for ev-
ery player, the predicted behavior in a new game must
have no more regret than demonstrated behavior does
in the observed game using the same parametric form
of reward function. The corresponding mathematical
program is:
max
σˆ,η,ν
H(σˆ)− Cν, subject to: (13)
σˆTR¯fii −
∑
fj∈Φ
ηfifj σ˜
TR
fj
j ≤ ν, ∀fi ∈ Φ¯∑
fj∈Φ
ηfifj σ˜
TR
fj
j − σˆTR¯fii ≤ ν, ∀fi ∈ Φ¯
ηfi ∈ ∆Φ,∀fi ∈ Φ¯; σˆ ∈ ∆A; ν ≥ 0.
In the above formulation, C > 0 is a slack penalty
parameter, which allows us to choose the trade-off be-
tween obeying the rationality constraints and maxi-
mizing the entropy. Additionally, we have omitted κ
above by considering it intrinsic to R.
We observe that this program is almost identical to the
behavior prediction program introduced above. We
have simply made substitutions of the regret matrices
and modification sets in the appropriate places. That
is, if Γ¯ = Γ, we recover prediction with a slack.
Given σˆ and ν, we can bound the violation of the
strong rationality constraint for any utility vector.
Lemma 3. If σˆ violates the strong rationality con-
straints in the slack formulation by ν then for all w
RΦ(σˆ, w) ≤ RΦ(σ˜, w) + ν ||w||1 . (14)
One could choose to institute multiple slack variables,
say one for each fi ∈ Φ¯, instead of a single slack across
all modification functions. Our choice is motivated by
the interpretation of the dual multipliers presented in
the next section. There, we will also address selection
of an appropriate value for C.
4. Duality and Efficient Optimization
In this section, we will derive, interpret and describe
a procedure for optimizing the dual program for solv-
ing the MaxEnt ICE problem. We will see that the
dual multipliers can be interpreted as utility vectors
and that optimization in the dual has computational
advantages. We begin by presenting the dual of the
Algorithm 1 Dual MaxEnt ICE
Input: T, γ, C > 0, R, R¯,Φ and Φ¯
∀fi ∈ Φ¯, αfi , βfi ← 1/(|Φ¯|K + 1)
for t from 1 to T do
/* compute the gradient */
∀a ∈ A¯, za ← exp
(
−∑fi∈Φ¯ r¯fiTi,a (αfi − βfi))
Z ←∑a∈A¯ za
for fi ∈ Φ¯ do
f∗j ← argmaxfj∈Φ σ˜TR
fj
j (α
fi − βfi)
gfi ← σ˜TRf
∗
j
j∗ −
∑
a∈A¯ zar¯
fi
i,a/Z
end for
/* descend and project */
γt ← γ/
√
t
ρ← 1 +∑fi,k αfik exp(−γtgfik ) + βfik exp(γtgfik )
∀fi ∈ Φ¯, k ∈ K, αfik ← Cαfik exp(−γtgfik )/ρ
∀fi ∈ Φ¯, k ∈ K, βfik ← Cβfik exp(γtgfik )/ρ
end for
return (α, β)
transfer program.
min
α,β,ξ
∑
fi∈Φ¯
max
fj∈Φ
[
σ˜TR
fj
j (α
fi − βfi)
]
+ logZ(α, β)
subject to: ξ +
∑
fi∈Φ¯
K∑
k=1
αfik + β
fi
k = C, α, β, ξ ≥ 0.
where Z(α, β) is the partition function,
Z(α, β) =
∑
a∈A¯
exp
−∑
fi∈Φ¯
r¯fiTi,a (α
fi − βfi)
 .
Removing the equality constraint is equivalent to dis-
allowing any slack. We derive the dual in the ap-
pendix (Waugh et al., 2011).
For C > 0, the dual’s feasible set has non-empty inte-
rior and is bounded. Therefore, by Slater’s condition,
strong duality holds – there is no duality gap. In par-
ticular, we can use a dual solution to recover σˆ.
Lemma 4. Given a dual solution, (α, β), we can re-
cover the primal solution, σˆ. Specifically,
σˆa = exp
−∑
fi∈Φ¯
r¯fiTi,a (α
fi − βfi)
 /Z(α, β). (15)
Intuitively, the probability of predicting an outcome is
small if that outcome has high regret.
In general, the dual multipliers are utility vectors as-
sociated with each modification function in Φ¯. Under
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the slack formulation, there is a natural interpretation
of these variables as a single utility vector. Given a
dual solution, (α, β) with slack penalty C, we choose
λfi = αfi − βfi , (16)
pifi =
1
C
K∑
k=1
αfik + β
fi
k , and (17)
wˆ =
∑
fi∈Φ¯
pifiλfi . (18)
That is, we can associate with each modification func-
tion a probability, pifi , and a utility vector, λfi . Thus,
a natural estimate for wˆ is the expected utility vector.
Note,
∑
fi∈Φ¯ pi
fi need not sum to one. The remaining
mass, ξ, is assigned to the zero utility vector.
The above observation implies that introducing a slack
variable coincides with bounding the L1 norm of the
utility vectors under consideration by C. This insight
suggests that we choose C ≥ ||w∗||1, if possible, as
smaller values of C will exclude w∗ from the feasi-
ble set. If a bound on the L1 norm is not available,
we may solve the prediction problem on the observed
game without slack and use ||wˆ||1 as a proxy.
The dual formulation of our program has important
inherent computational advantages. First, it is a opti-
mization over a simple set that is particularly well-
suited for gradient-based optimization, a trait not
shared by the primal program. Second, the number
of dual variables, 2|Φ|K, is typically much fewer than
the number of primal variables, |A| + 2|Φ|2. Though
the work per iteration is still a function of |A| (to com-
pute the partition function), these two advantages to-
gether let us scale to larger problems than if we con-
sider optimizing the primal objective. Computing the
expectations necessary to descend the dual gradient
can leverage recent advances in the structured, com-
pact game representations: in particular, any graphi-
cal game with low-treewidth or finite horizon Markov
game (Kakade et al., 2003) enables these computations
to be performed in time that scales only polynomially
in the number of decision makers or time-steps.
Algorithm 1 employs exponentiated gradient de-
scent (Kivinen & Warmuth, 1995) to find an optimal
dual solution. The step size parameter, γ, is commonly
taken to be
√
2 log |Φ¯|K/∆, with ∆ being the largest
value in any Rfii . With this step size, if the optimiza-
tion is run for T ≥ 2∆2 log (|Φ¯|K) /2 iterations then
the dual solution will be within  of optimal. Alter-
natively, one can exactly measure the duality gap on
each iteration and halt when the desired accuracy is
achieved. This is often preferred as the lower bound
on the number of iterations is conservative in practice.
5. Sample Complexity
In practice, we do not have full access to the agents’
true behavior – if we did, prediction would be straight-
forward and not require our estimation technique. In-
stead, we can only approximate it through finite obser-
vation of play. In real applications there are costs as-
sociated with gathering these observations and, thus,
there are inherent limitations on the quality of this
approximation. In this section, we will analyze the
sensitivity of our approach to these types of errors.
First, although |A| is exponential in the number of
players, our technique only accesses σ˜ through prod-
ucts of the form σ˜R
fj
j . That is, we need only approx-
imate these products accurately, not the distribution
σ˜. As a result, we can bound the approximation error
in terms of |Φ| and K.
Theorem 2. With probability at least 1 − δ, for any
w, by observing M ≥ 22 log 2|Φ|Kδ outcomes we have
RΦ(σ˜, w) ≤ RΦ(σ,w) + ∆ ||w||1.
The proof is an application of Hoeffding’s inequality
and is provided in the Appendix (Waugh et al., 2011).
As an immediate corollary, considering only the true,
but unknown, reward function w∗:
Corollary 1. With probability at least 1 − δ, by
sampling according to the above rule, RΦ(σˆ, w∗) ≤
RΦ(σ,w∗) + (∆ + ν) ||w∗||1 for σˆ with slack ν.
That is, so long as we assume bounded utility, with
high probability we need only logarithmic many sam-
ples in terms of |Φ| and K to closely approximate σRfjj
and avoid a large violation of our rationality condition.
We note that choosing Φ = Φint is particularly appeal-
ing, as |Φint| ≤ |N |A2, compared to |Φswap| ≤ |N |A!.
As internal regret closely approximates swap regret,
we do not lose much of the strategic complexity by
choosing the more limited set, but we require both
fewer observations and fewer computational resources.
6. Experimental Results
To evaluate our approach experimentally, we designed
a simple routing game shown in Figure 1. Seven
drivers in this game choose how to travel home during
rush hour after a long day at the office. The differ-
ent road segments have varying capacities, visualized
by the line thickness in the figure, that make some of
them more or less susceptible to congestion or to traffic
accidents. Upon arrival home, each driver records the
total time and distance they traveled, the gas that they
used, and the amount of time they spent stopped at
intersections or in traffic jams – their utility features.
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Tuesday, February 1, 2011
Figure 1. A visualization of the routing game.
In this game, each of the drivers chooses from four
possible routes (solid lines in Figure 1), yielding over
6,000 possible outcomes. We obtained an ε-social
welfare maximizing correlated equilibrium for those
drivers where the drivers preferred mainly to minimize
their travel time, but were also slightly concerned with
gas usage. The demonstrated behavior σ˜ was sampled
from this true behavior distribution σ.
First, we evaluate the differences between the true be-
havior distribution σ and the predicted behavior dis-
tribution σˆ trained from observed behavior sampled
from σ˜. In Figure 2 we compare the prediction accu-
racy when varying the number of observations using
log-loss, −∑a∈A σa log σˆa. The baseline algorithms
we compare against are: a maximum likelihood esti-
mate of the distribution over the joint-actions with a
uniform prior, an exponential family distribution pa-
rameterized by the outcome’s utilities trained with lo-
gistic regression, and a maximum entropy inverse op-
timal control approach (Ziebart et al., 2008a) trained
individually for each player.
In Figure 2, we see that MaxEnt ICE predicts behavior
with higher accuracy than all other algorithms when
the number of observations is limited. In particular,
it achieves close to its best performance with as few
at 16 observations. The maximum likelihood estima-
tor eventually overtakes it, as expected since it will
ultimately converge to σ, but only after 10,000 obser-
vations, or about as many observations as there are
outcomes in the game. This experiment demonstrates
that learning underlying utility functions to estimate
observed behavior can be much more data-efficient for
small sample sizes, and additionally, that the regret-
based assumptions of MaxEnt ICE are both reasonable
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Figure 2. Prediction error (log-loss) as a function of num-
ber of observations.
Table 1. Transfer error (log-loss) on unobserved games.
Problem Logistic Model MaxEnt Ice
Add Highway 4.177 3.093
Add Driver 4.060 3.477
Gas Shortage 3.498 3.137
Congestion 3.345 2.965
and beneficial in our strategic routing game setting.
Next, we evaluate behavior transfer from this routing
game to four similar games, the results of which are
displayed in Table 1. The first game, Add Highway,
adds the dashed route to the game. That is, we model
the city building a new highway. The second game,
Add Driver, adds another driver to the game. The
third game, Gas Shortage, keeps the structure of the
game the same, but changes the reward function to
make gas mileage more important to the drivers. The
final game, Congestion, adds construction to the major
roadway, delaying the drivers.
These transfer experiments even more directly demon-
strate the benefits of learning utility weights rather
than directly learning the joint-action distribution; di-
rect strategy-learning approaches are incapable of be-
ing applied to general transfer setting. Thus, we only
compare against the Logistic Model. We see from
Table 1 that MaxEnt ICE outperforms the Logistic
Model in all of our tests. For reference, in these new
games, the uniform strategy has a loss of approxi-
mately 6.8 in all games, and the true behavior has
a loss of approximately 2.7.
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7. Conclusion
In this paper, we extended inverse optimal control
to multi-agent settings by combining the principle of
maximum entropy with the game-theoretic notion of
regret. We observed that our formulation has a partic-
ularly appealing dual program, which led to a simple
gradient-based optimization procedure. Perhaps the
most appealing quality of our technique is its theo-
retical and practical sample complexity. In our ex-
periments, MaxEnt ICE performed exceptionally well
after only 0.1% of the game had been observed.
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Appendix
Rationality Properties and Primal Programs
The proof of Theorem 1 relies upon the following technical lemmas.
Lemma 5.
bTw ≤ max
ai∈A
ai
Tw ⇔ ∃λ ∈ ∆A s.t. bTw ≤ λTAw.
Proof of Lemma 5. Given bTw ≤ maxai∈A aiTw, choose
λi =
{
1 if ai = argmaxai∈A ai
Tw
0 otherwise
(19)
Thus, bTw ≤ maxai∈A aiTw = λTAw.
Given ∃λ ∈ ∆A s.t. bTw ≤ λTAw,
bTw ≤ λTAw (20)
≤
∑
aj∈A
λaj max
ai∈A
ai
Tw (21)
=
[
max
ai∈A
ai
Tw
] ∑
aj∈A
λaj (22)
= max
ai∈A
ai
Tw (23)
Lemma 6.
∀w ∈ RK , bTw ≤ max
i∈N
ai
Tw ⇔ ∃λ ∈ ∆A s.t. b = λTA.
Proof of Lemma 6.
∀w ∈ RK , bTw ≤ max
ai∈A
ai
Tw (24)
⇔ ∀w ∈ RK ,∃λ ∈ ∆A s.t. bTw ≤ λTAw (25)
⇔ ∀w ∈ RK ,∃λ ∈ ∆A s.t.
[
b− λTA]Tw ≤ 0 (26)
⇔ the following linear program has optimal value 0
max
w,t
bTw − t (27)
subject to: t ≥ aiTw,∀ai ∈ A.
The following linear feasibility problem is the dual of the above program
min
λ
0 (28)
subject to: b = λTA
λ ∈ ∆A.
By strong duality for linear programming, the primal has value 0 iff the dual is feasible, which is exactly when
∃λ ∈ ∆A s.t. b = λTA.
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Proof of Theorem 1.
∀w ∈ RK , RΦ(σˆ, w) ≤ RΦ(σ˜, w) (29)
⇔ ∀w ∈ RK ,max
fi∈Φ
σˆTRfii w ≤ max
fi∈Φ
σ˜TRfii w (30)
⇔ ∀fi ∈ Φ,∀w ∈ RK , σˆTRfii w ≤ max
fj∈Φ
σ˜TR
fj
j w (31)
⇔ ∀fi ∈ Φ,∃ηfi ∈ ∆Φ s.t. σˆTRfii =
∑
fj∈Φ
ηfifj σ˜
TR
fj
j (32)
The last step makes use of our second technical lemma.
Derivation of the Dual Program
The Lagrange dual is
min
α,β,γ,δ,u,v,ξ
max
σˆ,η,ν
−
∑
a∈A¯
σˆa log σˆa − Cν −
∑
fi∈Φ¯
σˆR¯fii − ∑
fj∈Φ
ηfifj σ˜
TR
fj
j − ν
αfi (33)
−
∑
fi∈Φ¯
∑
fj∈Φ
ηfifj σ˜
TR
fj
j − σˆR¯fii − ν
βfi (34)
+
∑
fi∈Φ¯
1− ∑
fj∈Φ
ηfifj
 γfi +
1−∑
a∈A¯
σˆa
 δ (35)
+
∑
fi∈Φ¯
∑
fj∈Φ
ηfifju
fi
fj
+
∑
a∈A
σˆava + νξ (36)
subject to: α, β, u, v, ξ ≥ 0 (37)
To solve the unconstrained inner optimization, we take derivatives w.r.t. σ, η and ν and set equal to 0:
log σˆa = −1−
∑
fi∈Φ¯
r¯fii,a(α
fi − βfi)− δ + va = 0, (38)
σ˜TR
fj
j (α
fi − βfi)− γfi + ufifj = 0, ∀fi,∈ Φ¯, fj ∈ Φ, and (39)
ξ − C +
∑
fi∈Φ¯
αfi + βfi = 0. (40)
Substituting into the Lagrangian, we get
min
α,β,γ,δ,u,v,ξ
∑
fi∈Φ¯
γfi + δ + exp(−1− δ)
∑
a∈A¯
exp
−∑
fi∈Φ¯
r¯fii,a(α
fi − βfi) + va
 (41)
subject to: σ˜TR
fj
j (α
fi − βfi)− γfi + ufifj = 0, ∀fi ∈ Φ¯, fj ∈ Φ (42)
ξ +
∑
fi∈Φ¯
αfi + βfi = C, (43)
α, β, u, v, ξ ≥ 0. (44)
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We note that u are slack variables, and that, by inspection, v = 0 at optimality. Thus, an equivalent program is
min
α,β,γ,δ,ξ
∑
fi∈Φ¯
γfi + δ + exp(−1− δ)
∑
a∈A¯
exp
−∑
fi∈Φ¯
r¯fii,a(α
fi − βfi)
 (45)
subject to: σ˜TR
fj
j λ
fi ≤ γfi , ∀fi ∈ Φ¯, fj ∈ Φ (46)
ξ +
∑
fi∈Φ¯
αfi + βfi ≤ C, (47)
α, β, ξ ≥ 0. (48)
We eliminate δ by setting its partial derivative to 0, solving for δ
δ = log
∑
a∈A¯
exp
−∑
fi∈Φ¯
r¯fii,a(α
fi − βfi)
− 1 (49)
and substituting back into the objective
min
α,β,γ,ξ
∑
fi∈Φ¯
γfi + log
∑
a∈A¯
exp
−∑
fi∈Φ¯
r¯fii,a(α
fi − βfi)
− 1 (50)
subject to: σ˜TR
fj
j (α
fi − βfi) ≤ γfi , ∀fi ∈ Φ¯, fj ∈ Φ (51)
ξ +
∑
fi∈Φ¯
αfi + βfi ≤ C, (52)
α, β, ξ ≥ 0. (53)
By inspection, at optimality, γfi = maxfj∈Φ σ˜
TR
fj
j (α
fi − βfi). Thus an equivalent program is
min
α,β,ξ
∑
fi∈Φ¯
[
max
fj∈Φ
σ˜TR
fj
j (α
fi − βfi)
]
+ log
∑
a∈A¯
exp
−∑
fi∈Φ¯
r¯fii,a(α
fi − βfi)
− 1 (54)
ξ +
∑
fi∈Φ¯
αfi + βfi = C, (55)
α, β, ξ ≥ 0. (56)
Proof of Lemma 4. In the derivation of the dual program, we observed that at optimality
log σˆa = −1−
∑
fi∈Φ¯
r¯fii,a(α
fi − βfi)− δ + va = 0. (57)
Noting v = 0 and substituting for the optimal δ, we get
log σˆa = −
∑
fi∈Φ¯
r¯fii,a(α
fi − βfi)− log
∑
a′∈A¯
exp
−∑
fj∈Φ¯
r¯
fj
j,a′(α
fj − βfj )
 . (58)
All that remains is to exponentiate both sides.
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Sample Complexity
Proof of Theorem 2.
P
(
max
fi∈Φ,k∈K
|σ˜Rfii − σRfii |k ≥ ∆M
)
≤ P
 ⋃
fi∈Φ,k∈K
|σ˜Rfii − σRfii |k ≥ ∆M
 (59)
≤
∑
fi∈Φ,k∈K
P
(
|σ˜Rfii − σRfii |k ≥ ∆M
)
(60)
≤
∑
fi∈Φ,k∈K
2 exp
(−2M
2
)
(61)
= 2|Φ|K exp
(−2M
2
)
(62)
≤ δ (63)
We use the union bound in step 2, and Hoeffding’s inequality in step 3. Solving for M , we get our result
M ≥ 2
2
log
2|Φ|K
δ
. (64)
Proof of Corollary 1. We have ∀w,RΦ(σˆ, w) ≤ RΦ(σ˜, w) + ν ||w||1, where ν depends on the choice of the slack’s
penalty. Thus, we have RΦ(σˆ, w∗) ≤ RΦ(σ˜, w∗) +ν ||w||1 ≤ RΦ(σ,w∗) + (∆ +ν) ||w∗||1 with probability at least
1− δ, so long as M is as large as Theorem 2 deems. We can make ν as small as we like by increasing the slack
penalty.
